

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00100 211938Z

17

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01

AEC-11 SAM-01 DRC-01 /152 W
----- 112197

R 211700Z JUN 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0174

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0100

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF MEETING

JUNE 18, 1974 BETWEEN UK AND SOVIET REPS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK DEL OFFS REPORT OF JUNE 18
CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DELOFFS SHUSTOV AND KUTOVOI
AS DISTRIBUTED TO THE AD HOC GROUP ON JUNE 21, 1974.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. MR GOODALL AND MR RICHARDS OF THE UK DELEGATION HAD
LUNCH ON 18 JUNE WITH MM. SHUSTOV AND KUTOVOI AT THE
RUSSIANS' INVITATION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00100 211938Z

2. M. SHUSTOV SAID EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES AT THE INFORMAL

SESSIONS OFTEN HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN DECIDING EXACTLY WHAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE TRYING TO SAY. THEY HAD LONG ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTERPRETATION OF WESTERN REMARKS

WHICH THEY OFTEN COULD NOT RESOLVE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF WESTERN INSISTENCE ON LIMITING THE DURATION OF THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT? MR GOODALL WENT THROUGH THE VARIOUS ASSURANCES WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE OFFERED ON THE LINK, INCLUDING THE REVIEW CLAUSE, AND THE WAYSHQN WHICH THESE WERE INTENDED TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS. M. SHUSTOV ASKED WHETHER THE OFFER OF A REVIEW CLAUSE WAS THEREFORE INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE EAST WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO TERMINATE A PHASE I AGREEMENT. MR GOODALL SAID IT WOULD ENABLE THE RUSSIANS TO DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONSEQUENCES.

3. M. SHUSTOV SAID THE REVIEW PROVISION WAS NEVERTHELESS UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE RUSSIANS, EVEN IF THEY ABROGATED A PHASE I AGREEMENT, TO RETURN TO CENTRAL EUROPE THE TROOPS THEY HAD WITHDRAWN. MR GOODALL SAID THIS WAS CERTAINLY TRUE FOR THE WEST. RECENT HISTORY HARDLY SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES BE TRUE FOR THE RUSSIANS.

4. M. SHUSTOV SAID THE EAST WERE "STILL NOT CONVINCED" THAT THE WEST WANTED A PHASE II NEGOTIATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY STILL BELIEVED WE DID NOT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE WEST SOUGHT A PHASE I AGREEMENT ONLY, AFTER WHICH ALL ITS NEGOTIATING AIMS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. MR GOODALL SAID THAT THE EAST WERE OF COURSE ENTITLED TO THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN INTENTIONS. BUT THIS CONSTRUCTION COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE PUT ON WHAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD ACTUALLY SAID. IT WAS CONSISTENT NEITHER WITH THE ASSURANCES WE WERE OFFERING NOR WITH THE KNOWN WISHES OF MORE THAN ONE WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT TO REDUCE ITS FORCES. THE WEST NEEDED A PHASE II AGREEMENT BOTH IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE COMMONCEILING AND TO ENABLE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO MAKE THE REDUCTIONS THEY DESIRED, BUT FELT ABLE TO MAKE ONLY ON A MUTUAL BASIS AND IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00100 211938Z

5. M. KUTOVOI REFERRED TO MR CALLAGHAN'S RECENT SPEECH TO THE FOREIGN PRESS ASSOCIATION AND HIS USE OF THE ARGUMENT THAT EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE UNDERTAKING OBLIGATIONS DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT THE UK DID NOT WISH TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES THIS PRESUMABLY

MEANT THAT THE UK NOW CONTEMPLATED ACCEPTING A CEILING ON ITS ENTIRE FORCES. A VIGOROUS REBUTTAL OF THIS SUGGESTION LED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN DISTINCTION BETWEEN FOREIGN AND INDIGENOUS FORCES, WITH M. KUTOVOI PRODUCING CHAPTER AND VERSE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS DISTINCTION HAD FORMED PART OF NATO TERMINOLOGY BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. M. KUTOVOI POINTED OUT THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DISTINCTION LAY IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES. WHEN THE TIME CAME TO SETTLE THE DETAILS OF THESE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH EXACTLY WHAT UNITS WERE GOING TO BE REDUCED IN EACH COUNTRY'S FORCES, AND WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN TO THEM. WHEN THIS POINT WAS REACHED, THERE WOULD BE A CRUCIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FORCES OF COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THE FORCES OF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE IT. WE SEEMED TO WANT TO GIVE THE UK THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS, TREATING IT ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF PHASING AND ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE US FOR THE PURPOSE OF WITHDRAWING OUR FORCES TO THEIR HOME TERRITORY RATHER THAN DISBANDING THEM.

6. IN REPLY, MR GOODALL DEVELOPED THE CONFIDENCE ARGUMENT MUCH ON THE LINES USED IN THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF 20 JUNE, STRESSING THAT THE ONLY DISTINCTION WHICH REFLECTED POLITICAL AND MILITARY REALITIES WAS THAT BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR PARTICIPANTS AND THE REAST. NO ONE COULD CONTEST THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE IN A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT CATEGORY, IN TERMS OF MILITARY POWER, FROM ALL THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

7. MR GOODALL THEN ASKED WHY, IF THE SIGNIFICANCE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00100 211938Z

OF THE FOREIGN/NATIONAL FORCES DISTINCTION LAY ONLY IN ITS APPLICATION TO THE MODALITIES OF EVENTUAL REDUCTIONS, AMBASSADOR KLEIN HAD PLACED SUCH EMPHASIS ON IT IN HIS LAST PLENARY STATEMENT. WAS THE WEST INTENDED TO DRAW SOME MESSAGE FROM THIS; IT SEEMED ODD THAT HE SHOULD DEVELOP THE DISTINCTION AT SUCH LENGTH AND THEN END BY COMMENDING THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY MADE NO SUCH DISTINCTION BUT REQUIRED ALL PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET IN THE SAME PROPORTION. WAS M. KLEIN JUST MAKING A DEBATING POINT, OR WAS HE IMPLYING THAT THE EAST COULD ACCEPT PHASED REDUCTIONS IN WHICH FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN PHASE I AND NATIONAL FORCES IN PHASE II?

8. THIS QUESTION SEEMED TO PUT THE RUSSIANS INTO SOME DIFFICULTY; AND IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER M. SHUSTOV IN PARTICULAR HAD FULLY UNDERSTOOD IT. M. KUTOVOI SAID THAT THE SOVIET POSITION REMAINED THAT ALL FORCES MUST BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. BUT M. SHUSTOV DID NOT SEEM TO BE AT ALL SURE. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SECURE REDUCTIONS BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, ADDING THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD NO INTENTION WHATEVER OF REDUCING ITS FORCES. WITH M. KUTOVOI LOOKING SCEPTICAL, HE SAID THAT ONE COULD ENVISAGE A FIRST PHASE IN WHICH US, UK AND CANADIAN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED; BUT THEN BAFFLINGLY ADDED, ALMOST AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT,

"AND NATIONAL FORCES TOO".

9. MR GOODALL SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE UK TAKING PART IN SUCH A PROGRAMME; FOR THE REASONS ALREADY GIVEN, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE US/USSR AND THE REST WAS CRUCIAL TO OUR SECURITY AND CENTRAL TO OUR PROPOSALS. BUT HE WANTED TO BE SURE THAT HE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD THE POINT WHICH M. SHUSTOV SEEMED TO BE MAKING. WAS HE SAYING THAT, ALTHOUGH THE STRONG SOVIET PREFERENCE WAS AGAINST A PHASED APPROACH, THEY COULD ACCEPT A PHASE I LIMITED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE US, THE UK AND CANADA? ONCE AGAIN, THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 MBFR V 00100 211938Z

RUSSIANS APPEARED SOMEWHAT AT A LOSS HOW TO ANSWER; BUT THEN M. SHUSTOV SAID FIRMLY THAT A PROPOSAL FOR A FIRST PHASE IN WHICH ALL FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED WOULD BE "HELPFUL" AND WELCOME TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

COMMENT

10. IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW MUCH WEIGHT TO PUT ON WHAT M. SHUSTOV SAID. IT IS NOT EVEN CLEAR THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT NEITHER HE NOR M. KUTOVOI WANTED TO DENY POSITIVELY THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SHIFT IN THE EASTERN POSITION ON THIS POINT. PROBABLY THEY FELT THAT THEY WERE BEING DRAWN ON TO GROUND ON WHICH THEY WERE WITHOUT CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS AND WERE UNCERTAIN EXACTLY HOW M. KHRUSHCHEV WANTED THE HAND PLAYED.

END TEXTRESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MBFR, MEETINGS, TROOP REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING DELEGATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MEETING REPORTS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, SOCIAL RECEPTIO NS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00100
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740164-0156
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740625/aaaaauvl.tel
Line Count: 219
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <22 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <09 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF MEETING JUNE 18, 1974 BETWEEN UK AND SOVIET REPS
TAGS: PARM, UK, UR, NATO, (SHUSTOV), (KUTOVOI), (GOODALL), (RICHARDS)
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005